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Abstract
The recent years have exhibited a burst in the amount of collaborative activities
among rms selling complementary products. This paper aims at providing a ra-
tionale for such a large extent of collaboration ties among complementors. To this
end, we analyze a game in which the two producers of a certain component have
the possibility to form pairwise collaboration ties with each of the two producers
of a complementary component. Once ties are formed, each of the four rms de-
cides how much to invest in improving the quality of the match with each possible
complementor, under the assumption that a rm with a collaboration link with a
complementor puts some weight on the complementors prot when making invest-
ment decisions. Once investment choices have taken place, all rms choose prices
for their respective components in a noncooperative manner. In equilibrium, rms
end up forming as many collaboration ties as it is possible, although they would all
prefer a scenario where collaboration were forbidden. In addition, a social planner
would also prefer such a scenario to the one arising in equilibrium. We show that
the result that collaboration is ine¢ cient for rms and society does not depend on
whether collaboration ties are formed in an exclusive manner: in fact, exclusivity
would only worsen the situation.
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1 Introduction
The recent decades have witnessed a shift in the competitive paradigm in high-tech in-
dustries that is driven to a large extent by the increasing importance of product comple-
mentarity. Indeed, cooperation among rms selling complementary products is playing
a prominent role in industries such as consumer electronics, semiconductors or telecom-
munications. More generally, hardware-software industries have exhibited a surge in the
extent of cooperation among producers of complementary goods with the aim of improv-
ing the interoperability of their respective products (see e.g. Moore 1996, Gawer and
Cusumano 2002, Adner 2006, Adner and Kapoor 2010, Gawer and Henderson 2007).1
Building such innovation ecosystems (Adner 2006) with the producers of complementary
goods seems to be the key competitive weapon in most high-tech industries, in which
the notion of competition has been displaced by that of co-opetition (Brandenburger and
Nalebu¤ 1996). A noteworthy feature of collaboration with complementors (i.e., rms
selling products that complement each other from the point of view of consumers) is that
it is not unusual for rms to collaborate with several complementors that sell substitutes
of each other.2
A natural question that arises in these settings is whether such extensive collabora-
tion is desirable from the standpoints of rms and consumers. Intuitively, one would be
tempted to think that collaboration in improving the interoperability of complementary
products is e¢ cient both for the rms involved, and in fact for society as a whole. The
purpose of this paper is to show that this need not be the case. We argue that collabora-
tion may result in equilibria in which both rms and society are worse o¤ than when rms
do not collaborate with complementors. This holds regardless of whether collaboration
ties are exclusive or not, under the assumption that collaboration with a complementor
leads a rm to care somewhat about the complementors prot when deciding on its
interoperability investments.
To formally analyze these issues, we consider a game played by two rms X1 and X2
that sell components that (perfectly) complement those sold by rms Y1 and Y2 (both
of which are also engaged in the game). In this mix-and-match setting (Matutes and
Regibeau 1988 and Economides 1989), there are four systems that are contemplated
by consumers when they make their purchase decisions: X1Y1, X1Y2, X2Y1 and X2Y2.
The game that we study consists of three stages. In the rst stage, each rm decides
1The interoperability of the components of which a composite good consists refers to their coherence
to work together with each other as a sole system. This is largely related to the absence of conicts
arising from possible incompatibility issues.
2To give concrete examples, mobile phone manufacturer Nokia allied rst with Intel to develop the
MeeGo operating system for smartphones, and later signed an agreement with Microsoft to support the
Windows Phone operating system. In addition, the Intel Architecture Lab (IAL) was formed to foster
investment in components complementary to Intels microprocessors by rms that many times competed
against each other.
1
whether to form a (pairwise) collaboration link with each of its possible complementors
(collaboration among rms selling substitute components of a system is not allowed). In
the second stage, each rm decides how much to invest in improving the interoperability
of its component with each of its complementors.3 It is assumed that a rm that has
formed a collaboration link with a complementor puts some weight on the complementors
prot when making investment decisions (e.g., a joint venture is formed). In the third
and nal stage, each rm decides independently on the price of its component, given past
interoperability investments of all the rms involved in the game.
We nd in this setting that the (unique) equilibrium collaboration network involves
each rm forming (pairwise) collaboration links with its two complementors. If collabora-
tion ties can be formed only in an exclusive manner, then exactly the same forces (subject
to the exclusivity restriction) imply that in equilibrium each rm forms a collaboration
link with just one of its complementors. In both the exclusive and non-exclusive settings,
equilibria exhibit all rms collaborating with at least one complementor, which seems to
accord well with the empirical evidence on innovation ecosystems.
Although equilibrium outcomes seem quite intuitive, intuition may conceal the e¤ect
of several forces that are working at the same time, and not necessarily in the same
direction. Thus, two complementors that form a new collaboration link between them
have an incentive to increase their investment in enhancing the interoperability with
each other, thus mitigating free riding to some extent. In addition, a new collaboration
tie between two complementors induces each to lower its investment in enhancing the
interoperability with the complementors rival. These two e¤ects conform to the intuition
that one may have on the impact of a new collaboration link. However, the formation of a
new collaboration tie not only a¤ects the incentives of the rms that become collaborators
but also a¤ects those of rms not involved in the new collaboration relationship. We show
that the strategic reactions elicited by a new collaboration link either make it even more
appealing to form the link or are not as negative for collaborators so as to dissuade
them from forming the link.4 Factoring all the incentives, we then have that it is always
desirable to form a new collaboration tie with a complementor with which a rm does
not have one. This rat race ends when no more ties are possible, and hence each rm
collaborates with as many complementors as it can.
In spite of the rat race underlying the unique equilibrium outcome, all rms prefer the
situation in which none collaborates with its complementors to that in which all collab-
3Greater investment in the interoperability of two components is modeled as an enhancement in the
(perceived) quality of the system comprising both components (e.g., the investment by X1 in improv-
ing interoperability with component Y2 is specic to Y2, and has no e¤ect on the interoperability of
components X1 and Y1).
4Put di¤erently, rms not involved in the new collaboration tie strategically react by weakening or
just slightly strengthening the systems in which the rms involved in the new collaboration link do not
participate. This is not enough to o¤set the positive e¤ect of mitigating free-riding that forming a new
collaboration tie has.
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orate with them. Hence, the equilibrium outcome exhibits the features of a prisonners
dilemma. When a rm collaborates with both complementors, it invests in enhancing
interoperability with each as much as it would in the absence of any collaborative tie
among rms.5 The reason is that beneting one of the complementors comes at the ex-
pense of harming the complementors competitor, so the rm adopts a neutral approach,
and the situation is as if no rm collaborated with any other rm (except for the costs of
collaboration). Thus, although a rm would benet from its competitor committing not
to collaborate with any complementors, it holds that all of them would be better o¤ if
each could make such commitment. Not only do we nd that collaboration is excessive
from the point of view of rms, but also from that of a social planner that can simply
choose how many collaboration links should be formed. Our baseline model assumes
that a rm cares when making interoperability decisions about the entire prot made the
complementors with which it collaborates. We show that results do not vary (actually,
they are strengthened) if collaborating with another rm entails caring only about the
prot generated for such a rm by the system in which both rms participate.
Our result that R&D collaboration among complementors results in private and public
ine¢ encies is in stark contrast with the result that R&D collaboration among rms selling
substitute goods may be desirable both for rms and society, as shown in the seminal
papers by DAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992).
These papers do not consider whether a rm has incentives to collaborate with other rms,
a limitation that has been overcome by subsequent work by Bloch (1995) using a coalitions
approach, and more recently by Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) using a bilateral link
formation approach.6 Both of these papers show that excessive collaboration may arise
in equilibrium. Although we also contend that equilibria displaying collaboration may
be ine¢ cient, it is worth noting that the results in Bloch (1995) and Goyal and Moraga-
González (2001) are derived for substitute goods, not for complementary goods, as is our
focus.
Our paper also contributes to the literature analyzing strategic competition when
there exists at least one complementor whose pricing activities interact with those of two
rms selling components that constitute substitutes for each other. This literature was
pioneered by Economides and Salop (1992) as an extension of early work by Cournot
(1838), who analyzed the e¤ect of a merger of two monopolists that produce complemen-
5A rm may invest more in enhancing interoperability with each complementor than it would in the
absence of any collaborative tie among rms. This happens when collaborating with a complementor
entails caring about the prot generated for such a complementor by the system comprising the two
products sold by these rms.
6See Leahy and Neary (1997) for a generalization of the models in DAspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) and Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992). See also Bloch (2005) for a comprehensive survey that
covers strategic network formation games in settings with R&D activities. Finally, it is worth pointing
out that Westbrock (2010) builds on Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) and Goyal and Joshi (2003) so
as to analyze how asymmetric R&D networks may be socially e¢ cient if collaboration ties are somewhat
costly to establish.
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tary goods.
The paper by Economides and Salop (1992) examines the e¤ect of cooperation in
prices (i.e., a merger) between the two existing producers of one of the two components
of which a system consists. They consider two scenarios, depending on whether or not
the two producers of the complementary component are already cooperating in prices.
In our work, we do not analyze price cooperation and, in fact, rms always choose prices
noncooperatively regardless of the structure of the collaboration network. The network
architecture does have an e¤ect on cooperation in R&D activities, though.7 Our paper
is also related to recent work by Casadesus-Masanell, Nalebu¤ and Yo¢ e (2008). Their
paper provides conditions under which a rm may benet from having a new competitor
enter with a substitute good whenever there exists a complementor for both the rm
under consideration and its new competitor. Our framework di¤ers in that it does not
focus on the e¤ects of entry on co-opetive settings, as they do, but rather it examines the
incentives to form collaboration links and to invest in enhancing interoperability among
complementors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the game
we consider. Section 3 characterizes the e¢ ciency properties of the unique equilibrium of
the game under the assumption that a rm can form any desired number of collaboration
links with its complementors. Section 4 examines how results are a¤ected if collaboration
ties are assumed to be exclusive. Section 5 shows that results are strengthened in the
more realistic case in which collaborating with another rm entails caring just about the
prot generated for such a rm by the system in which both rms participate. Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
We dene a system as a pair of perfectly complementary goods such as hardware and
software. The two perfect complements giving rise to a system are called components X
and Y . It is assumed that there are two rms costlessly producing component X, X1 and
X2, and two rms costlessly producing component Y , Y1 and Y2.8 As a result, there are
n = 4 systems: X1Y1, X1Y2, X2Y1 and X2Y2. System XiYj (i; j = 1; 2) can be bought by
any consumer at price pi;j = pXi + pYj , where pXi and pYj respectively denote the prices
at which components Xi and Yj are sold. Whenever there is no risk of confusion, we will
7There is a recent literature on (pure and mixed) bundling by rms that produce two perfectly
complementary components in competition with rms that produce just one of these components (see
e.g. Denicolò 2000 and Choi 2008). The reason why this stream of research building on Economides
and Salop (1992) is not related to our work is that we do not consider bundling, an issue that certainly
deserves a separate analysis beyond the scope of our paper.
8That production is costless is without loss of generality if the marginal cost of production is constant
and the xed costs of operation are not too large.
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write pij instead of pi;j for system XiYj. Also, rms X1 and X2 are typically referred to
as the complementors of rms Y1 and Y2, and vice versa.
It is assumed that there exists a unit mass of consumers willing to buy at most one
system. System XiYj is assumed to create a gross utility of vi;j to any consumer (again,
we will typically write vij instead of vi;j). The gross utility vij is largely the outcome
of choices by rms Xi and Yj. More specically, for some given scalar v > 0, we have
that vij = v + k
j
i + e
i
j, where k
j
i is rm Xis R&D investment in improving the quality
of the match with rm Yjs component and eij is rm Yjs R&D investment in improving
the quality of the match with rm Xis component.9 Thus, the investment variables k
j
i
and eij a¤ect the vertical attributes of system XiYj. Given their system-specicity, they
can be viewed as investments in improving the interoperability of components Xi and Yj,
although other interpretations are possible and may be more appealing depending on the
context.
Besides (possibly) being vertically di¤erentiated, systems are perceived by consumers
as being horizontally di¤erentiated in an exogenous manner. To model consumer prefer-
ences over horizontally di¤erentiated systems, we follow Chen and Riordan (2007) in using
their "spokes" model of nonlocalized di¤erentiation. Thus, each system is represented by
a point at the origin of a line of length 1=2, a line which is denoted by lXiYj for system
XiYj (i; j = 1; 2). The other end of a line is called its terminal, and it is assumed that the
terminals of all lines meet at a point called the center (see Figure 1). All the existing con-
sumers are uniformly distributed along the four lines. A consumer who is located on line
lXiYj at distance dXiYj 2 [0; 1=2] from system XiYj must incur a transportation/disutility
cost of tdXiYj when buying XiYj, where t  0 is a unit transportation cost. The same
consumer must incur transportation cost t(1  dXiYj) when purchasing any other system
(since lXiYj = 1=2 for all i; j = 1; 2). It is assumed that XiYj is the preferred system
for any consumer on lXiYj , and any other system has probability 1=(n  1) = 1=3 of con-
stituting the benchmark against which XiYj is to be compared by a consumer on lXiYj .
A system that is not deemed as preferred or as a benchmark for a consumer is assumed
to yield no utility to such a consumer. This assumption completes the description of the
spokes model we use for modeling the horizontal attributes of systems.10
9See Goyal, Konovalov and Moraga-González (2008) for another setting with relationship-specic
actions.
10Note that although in the most general version of the spokes model there are N  n systems
over which preferences are dened, we have let N = n for the sake of simplicity. This means that we
have assumed that there is no uncommercialized system that is possibly the object of desire by (some)
consumers.
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Figure 1 : The Spoke Model
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Given these features of rms and consumers, we study a three-stage game. In the rst
stage, rms Xi (i = 1; 2) simultaneously form pairwise collaboration links with rms Yj
(j = 1; 2). We let gij =  2 (0; 1] if a collaboration link between Xi and Yj is formed and
gij = 0 otherwise, with the convention that gji = gij. In addition, gij =  implies that
both rms Xi and Yj bear an arbitrarily small cost " > 0. We denote the network (i.e.,
the set of collaboration links) by g, that is, g = fg11; g12; g21; g22g 2 f0; g4. Note that in
principle we allow a rm to form more than one collaboration link with its complementors
(e.g., it may be possible that gi1 = gi2 =  for some i 2 f1; 2g). The parameter  intends
to capture how much a rm cares about a collaborators (net) prot when rms choose
investment levels in the second stage. We let  = 1 to simplify computations, but insights
and results do not vary qualitatively if  2 (0; 1).
In the second stage of the game we consider, we assume that rm Xi chooses k
j
i at the
same time as rm Yj chooses eij (i; j = 1; 2). Investments of k
1
i and k
2
i by rm Xi result in
an R&D cost equal to CXi(k
1
i ; k
2
i ) = (k
1
i )
2+(k2i )
2, whereas investments of e1j and e
2
j by rm
Yj result in an R&D cost equal to CYj(e
1
j ; e
2
j) = (e
1
j)
2 + (e2j)
2. It is assumed throughout
that gij =  implies that both rms Xi and Yj choose their investments in improving
their match quality in a (somewhat) cooperative manner. By this, we mean that each
also cares to some extent about the investment cost borne by the collaborator and the
prot that the collaborator will make in the product market. There are many formal
or informal arrangements that may lead a rm that collaborates with a complementor
to care about the complementors payo¤ when making investment decisions. Reasons
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range from research alliances (or collusive R&D cartels) to relational capital concerns in
ongoing relationships between rms that need each other. (Sometimes, the motives that
foster cooperation with a complementor may also preclude a rm from collaborating with
the complementors competitor; this is the reason why we will examine equilibria when
arrangements are exclusive in a later section.)
In the third and last stage, prices pXi and pYj are set simultaneously in the standard
noncooperative manner, and consumers make their purchase decisions given pij for i; j =
1; 2.
The solution concept is the same as in Goyal and Moraga-González (2001). Thus, for
each possible g, we will look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria, which will give equilib-
rium payo¤s given g. In order to solve for the equilibrium network structure in the rst
stage, we will use the pairwise stability notion proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
This concept is very weak, and aims at capturing (possibly) complex communication and
negotiation activities that would be hard to capture through noncooperative game theory.
Introducing the concept of pairwise stability requires some notation. In particular,
we let g   gij denote the network that results from suppressing the collaboration link
between rms Xi and Yj in network g. We also let g+gij denote the network that results
from adding a collaboration link between rms Xi and Yj in network g. Denoting the
equilibrium payo¤s (gross of ") obtained by rm Xi and Yj given network g by Xi(g)
and Yj(g), network g would be pairwise stable if the following two conditions held for all
i; j 2 f1; 2g: (i) Xi(g)  "  Xi(g  gij) and Yj(g)  "  Yj(g  gij) for gij =  and;
(ii) Xi(g + gij)  "  Xi(g) implies that Yj(g + gij)  " < Yj(g). The rst condition
requires that neither Xi nor Yj have an incentive to unilaterally break their collaboration
relationship (provided it exists). In turn, the second condition requires that, if rms Xi
and Yj are not linked to each other, then a desire by Xi to form a collaboration link with
Yj should not be reciprocal. It is worth noting that the results we derive still hold if the
network is required to be pairwise Nash stable, that is, if a rm is allowed to unilaterally
break more than one collaboration link at a time.
3 Resolution of the model
3.1 Third stage
As is standard, we solve the last two stages of the game by working backwards. So assume
that rst-stage and second-stage choices lead to a gross valuation of vij for system XiYj,
i; j = 1; 2. We rst derive the demand functions for each system and then we nd out
prots attained by each rm as a function of fv11; v12; v21; v22g. It is assumed throughout
that v is large enough so that the market is always fully covered and all rms make
positive sales. If collaboration between rms Xi and Yj drove a system in which none of
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them participates out of the market, then there would be an additional incentive to form
collaboration links. It is in this sense that we make the weakest case for collaboration to
take place, and still nd that it emerges in equilibrium.
In order to characterize the demand functions of each system, let lXiYj + lXi0Yj0 =
fd : d 2 lXiYj [ lXi0Yj0g (i; j; i0; j0 = 1; 2, with i 6= i0 or j 6= j0 or both) denote the
set consisting of all the points that belong to either line lXiYj or lXi0Yj0 or both. In
dening lXiYj + lXi0Yj0 , we establish the convention that i  i0 and j  j0.11 To nd out
the demand for system X1Y1, consider a consumer who happens to be on lX1Y1 + lX1Y2.
This occurs either because X1Y1 is her preferred system and X1Y2 is the benchmark, or
because X1Y2 is her preferred system and X1Y1 is the benchmark. The consumer will
be indi¤erent between both systems if her distance d1211 2 [0; 1] from X1Y1 is given by
v11   p11   td1211 = v12   p12   t(1  d1211),12 that is, if
d1211 =
t+ v11   v12 + p12   p11
2t
.
Because the measure of consumers between the locations of systems X1Y1 and X1Y2
is 2=n, we then have that the number of consumers who prefer X1Y1 over X1Y2 given
p11 and p12 is 2d1211=n. Similarly, the number of consumer who prefer X1Y1 over X2Yj
(j = 1; 2) can be shown to be 2d2j11=n, where
d2j11 =
t+ v11   v2j + p2j   p11
2t
.
Conditional upon X1Y1 being the preferred system or the benchmark one, we have that
X1Y2, X2Y1 and X2Y2 have each probability 1=(n   1) = 1=3 of being the system with
respect to which X1Y1 is to be assessed by consumers. It then follows that demand for
X1Y1 is
Q11 =
2(d1211 + d
21
11 + d
22
11)
n(n  1) .
Simple algebra yields that
Q11 =
3t+ 3v11   v12   v21   v22   3p11 + p12 + p21 + p22
12t
.
Similar steps lead to the following demand for system XiYj (i; j = 1; 2):
Qij =
3t+ 3vi;j   v3 i;j   vi;3 j   v3 i;3 j   3pi;j + p3 i;j + pi;3 j + p3 i;3 j
12t
.
Recalling that pi;j = pXi + pYj and letting QXi  Qi1 + Qi2 denote Xis demand, we
11Observe from the denition of lXiYj + lXi0Yj0 that i 6= i0 or j 6= j0 or both, so we cannot have both
i = i0 and j = j0.
12Recall that the set lX1Y1 + lX1Y2 has unit (Lebesgue) measure.
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have that
QXi(pXi ; pX3 i) =
3t+ vi;1 + vi;2   v3 i;1   v3 i;2   2pXi + 2pX3 i
6t
.
We have made the arguments of QXi explicit to highlight that the volume of sales by rm
Xi does not depend on how any complementary product is priced. Under full market
coverage, di¤erent prices by Y1 and Y2 just a¤ect with which component Xi wishes to be
matched, but rm Xis demand solely depends on pXi and pX3 i. One can similarly nd
out that
QYj(pYj ; pY3 j) =
3t+ v1;j + v2;j   v1;3 j   v2;3 j   2pYj + 2pY3 j
6t
,
where QYj  Q1j +Q2j.
Firms X1 and X2 choose pX1 and pX2 to maximize X1(pX1 ; pX2)  pX1QX1(pX1 ; pX2)
and X2(pX2 ; pX1)  pX2QX2(pX2 ; pX1), respectively. Using the strict concavity of prot
functions, we have that the solution to the following system delivers the equilibrium prices
for rms X1 and X2:
3t+ v11 + v12   v21   v22   4pX1 + 2pX2 = 0 (1)
and
3t+ v21 + v22   v11   v12   4pX2 + 2pX1 = 0. (2)
The system consisting of equations (1) and (2) has the following solution:
pXi =
9t+ vi;1 + vi;2   v3 i;1   v3 i;2
6
, i = 1; 2.
Similarly, one can show that
pYj =
9t+ v1;j + v2;j   v1;3 j   v2;3 j
6
, j = 1; 2.
We then have that the sales of system XiYj are
Qij =
9t+ 5vi;j + v3 i;3 j   3vi;3 j   3v3 i;j
36t
.
The prot that system XiYj generates for rm Xi (i; j = 1; 2) is 
j
Xi
 pXiQij, so
recalling that vij = v + k
j
i + e
i
j, we can write it as a function of second-stage choices:
jXi =
1
216t
(9t+ kji + k
3 j
i   kj3 i   k3 j3 i + eij + ei3 j   e3 ij   e3 i3 j)
(9t+ 5kji + k
3 j
3 i   3kj3 i   3k3 ji + 5eij + e3 i3 j   3ei3 j   3e3 ij ).
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Similarly, the prot that system XiYj generates for rm Yj can be written as follows:
iYj =
1
216t
(9t+ kji + k
j
3 i   k3 ji   k3 j3 i + eij + e3 ij   ei3 j   e3 i3 j)
(9t+ 5kji + k
3 j
3 i   3kj3 i   3k3 ji + 5eij + e3 i3 j   3ei3 j   3e3 ij ).
Letting Xi  1Xi +2Xi and Yj  1Yj +2Yj respectively denote the overall prots made
by rms Xi and Yj, it is easy to show that
Xi =
(9t+ k1i + k
2
i   k13 i   k23 i + ei1 + ei2   e3 i1   e3 i2 )2
108t
, i = 1; 2,
and
Yj =
(9t+ kj1 + k
j
2   k3 j1   k3 j2 + e1j + e2j   e13 j   e23 j)2
108t
, j = 1; 2.
The following is worth noting for i; j = 1; 2:
Remark 1 We have that
@2Xi
@kji @k
3 j
i
=
@2Xi
@kji @e
i
j
=
@2Xi
@kji @e
i
3 j
> 0
and
@2Xi
@kji @k
j
3 i
=
@2Xi
@kji @k
3 j
3 i
=
@2Xi
@kji @e
3 i
j
=
@2Xi
@kji @e
3 i
3 j
< 0.
Similarly,
@2Yj
@eij@e
3 i
j
=
@2Yj
@eij@k
j
i
=
@2Yj
@eij@k
j
3 i
> 0
and
@2Yj
@eij@e
i
3 j
=
@2Yj
@eij@e
3 i
3 j
=
@2Yj
@eij@k
3 j
i
=
@2Yj
@eij@k
3 j
3 i
< 0.
Essentially, a rms incentive to invest in enhancing the match quality with any one of
its complementors becomes less intense as there is less investment in any of the systems in
which the rm participates. This incentive is also weakened as there is more investment
in any of the systems in which it does not participate.
Remark 1 will be heavily used in what follows, together with the following one that
applies to the cases in which two complementors collaborate with each other:
Remark 2 For i; j = 1; 2,
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@kji @e
i
j
> 0,
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@kji @k
3 j
3 i
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@kji @e
3 i
3 j
< 0
and
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@kji @k
3 j
i
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@kji @e
i
3 j
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@kji @k
j
3 i
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@kji @e
3 i
j
= 0,
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whereas
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@k3 ji @e
i
3 j
> 0,
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@k3 ji @k
j
3 i
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@k3 ji @e
3 i
j
< 0 and
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@k3 ji @k
j
i
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@k3 ji @e
i
j
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@k3 ji @k
3 j
3 i
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@k3 ji @e
3 i
3 j
= 0.
Similarly,
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@e3 i3 j@k
3 j
3 i
> 0,
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@e3 i3 j@e
i
j
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@e3 i3 j@k
j
i
< 0 and
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@e3 i3 j@e
i
3 j
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@e3 i3 j@k
3 j
i
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@e3 i3 j@e
3 i
j
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@e3 i3 j@k
j
3 i
= 0,
whereas
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@ei3 j@k
3 j
i
> 0,
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@ei3 j@e
3 i
j
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@ei3 j@k
j
3 i
< 0 and
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@ei3 j@e
3 i
3 j
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@ei3 j@k
3 j
3 i
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@ei3 j@e
i
j
=
@2(Xi + 

Y3 j)
@ei3 j@k
j
i
= 0.
We now have that a rms incentive to invest in enhancing the match quality with any
one of its complementors becomes less intense as there is less investment in the system in
which both rms participate. This incentive is also weakened as there is more investment
in the system in which neither of them participates.
We also have that the following holds when a rm collaborates with both of its com-
plementors:
Remark 3 For i; j = 1; 2,
@2(Xi + 

Yj
+ Y3 j)
@kji @e
i
j
>
@2(Xi + 

Yj
+ Y3 j)
@kji @k
j
3 i
=
@2(Xi + 

Yj
+ Y3 j)
@kji @e
3 i
j
> 0,
and
@2(Xi + 

Yj
+ Y3 j)
@kji @k
3 j
3 i
=
@2(Xi + 

Yj
+ Y3 j)
@kji @e
3 i
3 j
<
@2(Xi + 

Yj
+ Y3 j)
@kji @k
3 j
i
=
@2(Xi + 

Yj
+ Y3 j)
@kji @e
i
3 j
< 0.
Intuitively, we now have that rm Xis incentive to invest in enhancing the match
quality with Yj becomes less intense as there is less investment in the systems in which
rm Yj participates (especially in system XiYj). This incentive is also weakened as there
is more investment in the systems in which Yj does not participate (especially in system
X3 iY3 j).
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To build intuition for the subsequent analysis, note that, in principle, collaboration
between two complementors has two direct e¤ects. On the one hand, collaborators in-
ternalize the positive externality that each imposes on the other, and as a result each
invests more in enhancing the quality of the match with the other. We call this the
"forget-free-riding" e¤ect. On the other hand, collaboration between two complementors
induces each to invest less in enhancing the quality of the match with its complementors
rival. We call this the "harm-my-competitor" e¤ect of collaboration. In the light of Re-
marks 1, 2 and 3, the "forget-free-riding" and "harm-my-competitor" e¤ects arising from
a collaborative link also have several strategic e¤ects whose nature and extent depends on
the existing collaboration network. What follows is an analysis of the interaction of these
multiple e¤ects for diverse collaborative structures under the assumption that  = 1.
When  2 (0; 1), the existing e¤ects are softened, but do not disappear, so the insights
are qualitatively the same (proof available upon request).
3.2 Second and rst stages
We now consider the investment subgames for each of the possible network structures aris-
ing from the rst stage. Up to a relabeling of rms, there are six network structures that
should be considered (see Figure 2): g1  f0; 0; 0; 0g, g2  f1; 0; 0; 0g, g3  f1; 0; 0; 1g,
g4  f1; 1; 0; 0g, g5  f1; 1; 0; 1g and g6  f1; 1; 1; 1g. Besides characterizing equilibrium
play for each, we also show which one emerges as the unique (pairwise) stable network,
thus e¤ectively providing a complete resolution of the network formation game.
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Figure 2 : Network Structures
g1  f0; 0; 0; 0g g2  f1; 0; 0; 0g g3  f1; 0; 0; 1g
g4  f1; 1; 0; 0g g5  f1; 1; 0; 1g g6  f1; 1; 1; 1g
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We start by analyzing simple network structures, which means that no rm has more
than one collaboration link (i.e., g = g1, or g = g2, or g = g3). We then analyze more
complex network structures (i.e., g = g4, or g = g5, or g = g6). At this point, it is useful
to recall our behavioral assumptions, so let us dene the following functions to this end:
Xi(k
1
i ; k
2
i ; k
1
3 i; k
2
3 i; e
1
j ; e
2
j ; e
1
3 j; e
2
3 j)  Xi   CXi(k1i ; k2i )
and
Yj(e
1
j ; e
2
j ; e
1
3 j; e
2
3 j; k
1
i ; k
2
i ; k
1
3 i; k
2
3 i)  Yj   CYj(e1j ; e2j).
Given network architecture g, we then have that rm Xi (i = 1; 2) chooses k1i  0 and
k2i  0 to maximize Xi+
P2
j=1 gijYj , while rm Yj (j = 1; 2) chooses e
1
j  0 and e2j  0
to maximize Yj+
P2
i=1 gijXi, where we have suppressed the arguments of the functions
to avoid clutter. We also recall that all second-stage choices are made simultaneously.
Lastly, we note that we will avoid equilibrium inexistence by making t large enough.13
13The inexistence problem is already present in Casadesus-Masanell, Nalebu¤ and Yo¢ e (2008), who
get around it by introducing vertical di¤erentiation.
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3.2.1 Simple network structures
We rst consider network g = g1  f0; 0; 0; 0g, so rm Xi (i = 1; 2) maximizes Xi,
whereas rm Yj (j = 1; 2) maximizes Yj . We assume that t > 1=54 to make payo¤
functions strictly concave. We then have that the unique equilibrium is symmetric, and
it is characterized by each rm investing kji (g
1) = e1j(g
1) = 1=12 (i; j = 1; 2) in trying
to (unilaterally) improve the match with each complementary component. Equilibrium
prots for g = g1 are
Xi(g
1) = Yj(g
1) =
54t  1
72
,
which are positive for t > 1=54.
Recalling that we have assumed that  = 1, we now turn to the case in which there
is just one collaboration link, i.e., g = g2  f1; 0; 0; 0g. In this case, rms X1 and Y1
maximize joint prots X1 + Y1. In turn, rm X2 maximizes X2, whereas rm Y2
maximizes Y2. If one makes the assumption for g = g
2 that t > 4=54 to ensure that
payo¤ functions are strictly concave and investment levels are positive, it holds that
the unique equilibrium is characterized by the following investments in match quality:
k11(g
2) = e11(g
2) =
27t  1
9(18t  1) , k
2
1(g
2) = e21(g
2) = 0 and k12(g
2) = k22(g
2) = e12(g
2) =
e22(g
2) =
27t  2
18(18t  1) . Equilibrium prots for g = g
2 are then
X1(g
2) = Y1(g
2) =
(27t  1)3
81(18t  1)2
and
X2(g
2) = Y2(g
2) =
(27t  2)2(54t  1)
162(18t  1)2 .
All prots are positive for t > 2=54, so our assumption that t > 4=54 su¢ ces for making
prots positive. It can also be shown that it is su¢ cient for making equilibrium quantities
of each system positive, as required by the full market coverage assumption we have made.
We are now in a position to prove the following result.
Lemma 1 Network g = g1 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > 4=54.
Proof. Noting that g2 = g1 + g11, it holds that X1(g
2) = Y1(g
2) > Y1(g
1) =
X1(g
1) for t > 4=54. For small enough " > 0, it then follows that X1(g
2) "  X1(g1)
does not imply that Y1(g
2)  " < Y1(g1), and hence g = g1 cannot be a stable network.
The result follows because both rms X1 and Y1 would benet from forming a col-
laboration tie if the network were g = g1. To understand why this happens, note that,
relative to the case in which g = g1, there arise several incentives for rms X1 and Y1 if
14
g = g2. The harm-my-competitor e¤ect leads them to decrease k21 and e
2
1.
14 In addition,
the forget-free-riding e¤ect leads to higher k11 and e
1
1. Overall, both k
1
1 and e
1
1 end up
increasing relative to the case in which g = g1, whereas k21 and e
2
1 are both reduced as
much as possible. By Remark 1, the lower k21 has a positive marginal impact on rm X2s
payo¤, whereas the lower e21 has a negative impact on rm X2s marginal payo¤. Taking
into account that both of these e¤ects cancel out and that system X1Y1 is stronger, it
follows from Remark 1 that rm X2 prefers to lower k12. The lower k
1
2 + e
2
1 implies that
X2Y1 is weakened, which coupled with the fact that X1Y1 is stronger, induces rm X2 to
reduce k22. FirmX2 equally benets from investing in the match with Y1 or Y2, so we must
have that both k12 and k
2
2 are reduced by the same amount because the strict convexity of
R&D costs implies that it is more e¢ cient to spread e¤ort over two complementors rather
than just one. Analogous incentives for rm Y2 imply that both e12 and e
2
2 are lowered by
the same amount.
In short, the result that X1 and Y1 can mutually benet from forming a link with each
other is largely driven by the forget-free-riding and harm-my-competitor e¤ects, as well
as the positive strategic e¤ects that these direct e¤ects have on noncollaborating rms.
We conclude this subsection by analyzing what happens if each rm has one, and only
one, collaboration link, i.e., g = g3  f1; 0; 0; 1g. Then rms Xi and Yj (i; j = 1; 2; i =
j) maximize their joint payo¤, Xi + Yj . Under the assumption that t > 1=54, all
payo¤ functions are strictly concave, and the unique equilibrium is symmetric, and it is
characterized by the following investments in match quality: k11(g
3) = k22(g
3) = e11(g
3) =
e22(g
3) = 1=6 and k21(g
3) = k12(g
3) = e21(g
3) = e12(g
3) = 0. Equilibrium prots for g = g3
are
Xi(g
3) = Yj(g
3) =
27t  1
36
,
which are positive for t > 2=54. However, we make the somewhat stronger condition that
t > 12=54 in order to make quantity sold of each system positive in equilibrium. We then
have all the elements to rule out g = g2 as an equilibrium outcome.
Lemma 2 Network g = g2 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > 12=54.
Proof. Noting that g3 = g2 + g22, it holds that X2(g
3) = Y2(g
3) > Y2(g
2) =
X2(g
2) for t > 12=54. For small enough " > 0, it then follows that X2(g
3) "  X2(g2)
does not imply that Y2(g
3)  " < Y2(g2), and hence g = g2 cannot be a stable network.
Starting from g = g2, let us consider the incentive for rms X2 and Y2 to form a
tie, an incentive that is somewhat similar to the one that rms X1 and Y1 to form a link
14Notice by Remark 1 that the decrease in k21 creates an incentive to decrease k
1
1, whereas the lower e
2
1
stimulates higher k11. Because k
2
1 and e
2
1 have the same impact on rm X1s marginal payo¤, both e¤ects
o¤set each other, and hence there is no incentive for X1 to change k11. A similar argument explains why
rm Y1 has no incentive to change e11.
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starting from g = g1. The harm-my-competitor leads them to decrease k12 and e
1
2, whereas
the forget-free-riding e¤ect leads to higher k22 and e
2
2. Overall, both k
2
2 and e
2
2 end up
increasing relative to the case in which g = g2, whereas k12 and e
1
2 are both reduced as
much as possible. We now turn to how rms X1 and Y1 react. In choosing k11, rm X1
does not care about system X2Y1 because of its collaboration with rm Y1 (by Remark 2),
so the fact that system X2Y2 becomes stronger induces it to lower k11 relative to the case
in which g = g2. In addition, the fact that system X1Y2 is weakened creates a pressure
towards lowering k21, but there arises a tension to increase k
2
1 as X2Y1 becomes weaker (by
Remark 2). Because both e¤ects cancel out, k21 remains at the same level as when g = g
2.
A closely similar analysis explains why rm Y1 reduces e11 and leaves e
2
1 unchanged.
In short, g2 is not a stable network because rms X2 and Y2 would mutually benet
from forming a link. This incentive to form a link arises because of the forget-free-
riding and harm-my-competitor e¤ects, as well as the the positive strategic e¤ect of their
collaboration. Thus, rms X1 and Y1 reduce their investment in each other, and leave
unchanged the investments in enhancing the match with the complementors with which
they do not collaborate.
3.2.2 Complex network structures
We now deal with network structures in which at least one rm has more than one
collaboration link. We start by analyzing g = g4  f1; 1; 0; 0g. Firm X1 maximizes
X1 +Y1 +Y2, whereas rm X2 maximizes X2 . In turn, rm Yj (j = 1; 2) maximizes
X1 +Yj .
Given that we focus throughout on large enough t, the unique equilibrium in this
case happens to be noninterior.15 In particular, we assume that t > 5=54 to ensure
that payo¤s are strictly concave as well as the non-negativity of equilibrium prots,
investment levels and quantities sold. Then we have that k11(g
4) = k21(g
4) =
54t  1
36(18t  1) ,
k12(g
4) = k22(g
4) =
54t  5
36(18t  1) , e
2
1(g
4) = e22(g
4) = 0 and e11(g
4) = e12(g
4) =
27t  1
9(18t  1) . As
for equilibrium prots for g = g4, they are
X1(g
4) =
(54t  1)3
648(18t  1)2 ,
X2(g
4) =
(54t  5)2(54t  1)
648(18t  1)2
15It can be shown when g = g4 that there exist smaller values of t for which a noninterior equilibrium
exists (proof available on request). However, the equilibrium payo¤s cannot be compared with those
of some network structures for which an equilibrium does not exist if t is not small enough. This is
the reason why we always let t be large enough for our purposes of comparison among all the possible
network structures.
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and
Yj(g
4) =
78732t3   11664t2 + 459t  4
324(18t  1)2 , j = 1; 2.
To get some understanding of what is going on, let us take the case in which g = g2
as a benchmark of the current situation. Relative to g = g2, k21 and e
1
2 increase (owing to
the forget-free-riding e¤ect), which leads to slightly higher e22 by Remark 2. In addition,
relative to g = g2, k11 and e
2
2 decrease because of the harm-my-competitor e¤ect, an e¤ect
that also creates some pressure towards slightly lower e12 in the light of Remark 2. So,
overall, we have that k21 and e
1
2 increase and k
1
1 and e
2
2 decrease relative to the case in
which g = g2.
After analyzing how collaboration a¤ects those directly involved, we now turn to
analyzing the competitive reaction when going from network g = g2 to g = g4. By
Remark 1, the lower k11 has a positive marginal impact on rm X2s payo¤, whereas
the lower e22 has a negative impact on rm X2s marginal payo¤. Both of these e¤ects
cancel out, so the fact that system X1Y2 is stronger implies by Remark 1 that rm X2
prefers to lower k22. The decrease in k
2
2 + e
2
2, together with the stronger X1Y2, induces
rm X2 to reduce k12 too (as per Remark 1). The change in rm Y1s behavior is more
complex, though. Firm Y1 does not care about systemX1Y2 becoming stronger because it
collaborates with rm X1. However, the lower k11 creates a tension to decrease e
1
1, which
is exacerbated after taking into account that rm Y1 cares about rm X1s prot. The
lower e22 creates pressure to increase e
1
1, though, a pressure accentuated because Y1 cares
about rm X1s prot. Because the tensions to increase and decrease e11 o¤set each other,
e11 ends up not changing relative to g = g
2. Furthermore, the fact that rm Y1 cares about
rm X1s prot implies that it does not care about systems X1Y1 and X2Y2 becoming
weaker or stronger when it comes to choosing e21. Because system X1Y2 is stronger, there
arises a tension to lower e21 relative to the case in which g = g
2. As a result, e21 is kept at
its minimum possible level, namely zero.
We analyze now the cases in which g = g5  f1; 1; 0; 1g. Firm X1 maximizes X1 +
Y1+Y2, whereas rm X2 maximizes X2+Y2. In turn, rm Y1 maximizes X1+Y1,
whereas rm Y2 maximizes X1 + X2 + Y2. In this case, the unique equilibrium that
exists with all rms active is noninterior, and it requires that t be su¢ ciently large.16 More
precisely, we let t > 6=54, which guarantees that payo¤s are strictly concave and that
equilibrium prots, investment levels and quantities sold are all non-negative. Solving for
an equilibrium then yields k11(g
5) = e22(g
5) =
27t  2
18(18t  1) , k
2
1(g
5) = e12(g
5) =
3t
2(18t  1) ,
k12(g
5) = e21(g
5) = 0 and k22(g
5) = e11(g
5) =
1
6
. As for prots in equilibrium for g = g5,
16Equilibrium inexistence for t that is not large enough also happens when g = g6. The proof is
available upon request.
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they are
X1(g
5) = Y2(g
5) =
39366t3   3645t2 + 108t  2
162(18t  1)2
and
X2(g
5) = Y1(g
5) =
3(8748t3   1620t2 + 84t  1)
(18t  1)2 .
We then have enough elements to discard g = g3 as an equilibrium outcome.
Lemma 3 Network g = g3 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > 12=54.
Proof. Noting that g5 = g3 + g12, it holds that X1(g
5) = Y2(g
5) > Y2(g
3) =
X1(g
3) for t > 12=54. For small enough " > 0, it then follows that X1(g
5)   2" 
X1(g
3)  " does not imply that Y2(g5)  2" < Y2(g3)  ", and hence g = g3 cannot be
a stable network.
We now provide an intuitive explanation so as to understand what changes when rms
X1 and Y2 form an extra link in g = g3 in order to give rise to network conguration
g = g5. As usual, the forget-free-riding e¤ect increases k21 and e
1
2, but no incentive to
vary k11 or e
2
2 arises as a result of these changes.
17 In turn, the harm-my-competitor e¤ect
decreases k11 and e
2
2, and again there arises no incentive to vary k
2
1 or e
1
2. Consequently,
k21 and e
1
2 are higher and k
1
1 and e
2
2 are lower under g = g
3 than under g = g5. The
lower k11 induces rm Y1 to decrease e
1
1, but the fact that system X2Y2 is weaker induces
it to increase e11.
18 Because both e¤ects cancel out, e11 nally does not change relative to
g = g3. In addition, the fact that system X1Y2 is stronger creates a tension to lower e21
below its level under g = g3, namely zero, so rm Y1 chooses not to vary e21 either. Using
a similar argument for rm X2 explains why k12 and k
2
2 remain at the same level as in the
case in which g = g3.
In short, adding a link between X1 and Y2 in network g = g3 has no strategic e¤ect,
so the result is all driven by the positive direct e¤ects of collaboration.
Not only can g = g3 be discarded as an equilibrium outcome, but also g = g4 can be
ruled out.
Lemma 4 Network g = g4 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > 6=54.
Proof. Noting that g5 = g4 + g22, it holds that X2(g
5) > X2(g
4) and Y2(g
5) >
Y2(g
4) for t > 6=54. For small enough " > 0, it then follows that X2(g
5)  "  X2(g4)
17Note by Remark 2 that
@2(X1 + 

Y1
)
@k11@k
2
1
=
@2(X1 + 

Y1
)
@k11@e
1
2
= 0 and
@2(Y2 + 

X1
)
@e22@e
1
2
=
@2(Y2 + 

X1
)
@e22@k
2
1
= 0.
18Note that the fact that X1Y2 is weaker is not viewed as something that stimulates higher e11 because
rm Y1 also cares about X1s prot, and rm X1 would like to lower e11 if X1Y2 became weaker for some
reason.
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does not imply that Y2(g
5)   2" < Y2(g4)   ", and hence g = g4 cannot be a stable
network.
We now explain why rms X2 and Y2 have an incentive to form a link in g = g4 in
order to give rise to network g = g5. On the one hand, the forget-free-riding e¤ect leads
to higher k22 and e
2
2, which creates a pressure towards slightly increasing k
1
2 even though
e12 remains invariant. On the other hand, the harm-my-competitor e¤ect leads to lower
k12 and e
1
2, which results in slightly lower k
2
2 even though e
2
2 remains invariant. Overall,
k22 and e
2
2 increase, whereas k
1
2 and e
1
2 decrease. In the light of Remark 3, the facts that
system X2Y2 becomes stronger and X2Y1 becomes weaker induce rm X1 to lower k11
relative to g = g4 (despite the reduction in e12 weakens system X1Y2, which creates an
incentive to increase k11). In addition, rm X1 increases k
2
1 because of the stronger X2Y2
and weaker X2Y1, despite the reduction in e12 creates some incentive to lower lower k
2
1. In
turn, rm Y1 has an incentive to lower e11 because of the reduction in k
1
1 and the stronger
system X2Y2, as stems from Remark 2. However, rm Y1 does not care about system
X2Y2 when choosing how to vary e21, but the lower k
2
1 and e
1
2 induce it to reduce e
2
1, as
does the lower k12. Because e
2
1 cannot be diminished below zero, it remains unchanged at
zero.
In short, the forget-free-riding and harm-my-competitor e¤ects create an incentive for
rms X2 and Y2 to form a new link starting from network g = g4. In addition, their
respective competitors react by weakening system X1Y1 and strengthening X1Y2, so the
strategic e¤ect is positive for rm X2 and has an ambiguous sign for rm Y2 (recall that
Y2 cares about X1s prot). Overall, however, rms X2 and Y2 mutually benet from
forming a link, and hence g = g4 cannot be stable.
We deal now with the nal network that needs to be considered, namely g = g6 
f1; 1; 1; 1g. Firm Xi (i = 1; 2) maximizes Xi + Y1 + Y2, whereas rm Yj maximizes
X1 + X2 + Yj . Under the assumption that t > 1=54 (which ensures payo¤ concavity
and non-negativity of the relevant variables), the unique equilibrium is symmetric and
involves the following investment levels: kji (g
6) = eij(g
6) = 1=12 (i; j = 1; 2). Equilibrium
prots for g = g6 are
Xi(g
6) = Yj(g
6) =
54t  1
72
,
which are positive for t > 1=54. Using these prots, we can rule out g = g5 as an
equilibrium network.
Lemma 5 Network g = g5 cannot arise in equilibrium for t > 6=54.
Proof. Noting that g6 = g5 + g21, it holds that X2(g
6) > X2(g
5) and Y1(g
6) >
Y1(g
5) for t > 6=54. For small enough " > 0, it then follows that X2(g
6)   2" 
X2(g
5)  " does not imply that Y1(g6)  2" < Y1(g5)  ", and hence g = g5 cannot be
a stable network.
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We provide the intuition for why rms X2 and Y1 would like to be linked to each other
starting from g = g5. On the one hand, the forget-free-riding e¤ect results in higher k12 and
e21, and no tension arises to vary either k
2
2 or e
1
1. On the other, the harm-my-competitor
e¤ect results in lower k22 and e
1
1, and no tension arises to vary either k
1
2 or e
2
1. Hence, we
have that k12 and e
2
1 increase relative to g = g
5, but k22 and e
1
1 decrease. Based on Remark
3, the facts that system X2Y1 becomes stronger and X2Y2 becomes weaker induce rm
X1 to increase k11 relative to g = g
5 (despite the reduction in e11 weakens system X1Y1,
which creates an incentive to lower k11). In addition, rm X1 lowers k
2
1 because of the
stronger X2Y1 and weaker X2Y2, despite the reduction in e11 creates some incentive to
raise k21. One can similarly explain why e
1
2 is reduced, but e
2
2 turns out to increase.
The fact that Xi(g
6)  2" > Xi(g5)  " for i = 1; 2 and Yj(g6)  2" > Yj(g5)  "
for j = 1; 2 implies that g = g6 is an equilibrium network for t > 6=54. This result,
together with all the above Lemmata, leads to our rst result.
Proposition 1 For t > 12=54, the unique equilibrium network structure is the complete
network, namely g = f1; 1; 1; 1g. In equilibrium, rm Xi chooses to invest kji (g) = 1=12
in improving the quality of its match with complementor Yj, whereas rm Yj chooses
to invest eij(g
) = 1=12 in improving the quality of its match with complementor Xi
(i; j = 1; 2). Each rm earns a payo¤ of (54t  1)=72  2".
We recall at this point that we have used the notion of pairwise stability as our
solution concept for the strategic network formation game we consider. In the context of
our game, the main drawback of this solution concept has to do with the possibility that
a rm with several links may want to sever more than one link at a time.19 However,
this criticism does not apply to the game under consideration. Indeed, the fact that
X2(g
6)  2" > X2(g4) for small " > 0 implies that the complete network is stable even
if the pairwise stability solution concept is augmented to allow for the deletion of several
links at a time (the complete network is then said to be pairwise Nash stable).
We study from now on the e¢ ciency properties of the complete network and the
competitive play it implies. Taking into account that forming a collaboration link costs
" > 0 and kji (g) = e
i
j(g) = 1=12 (i; j = 1; 2) for both g = g
1 and g = g, we have just
proved the following result about the desirability of the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 2 For t > 12=54, the unique equilibrium network g = f1; 1; 1; 1g is socially
suboptimal and results in a payo¤ for each rm smaller than that achieved when g =
f0; 0; 0; 0g.
Hence, rms (and society) would do better if they could commit not to collaborate,
since collaboration is costly and it cannot improve upon the case in which each rm acts
19See Jackson (2008, pp. 156 and 371-376) for a thorough discussion of the virtues and limitations of
pairwise stability as a solution concept.
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uncoordinatedly. This result follows because the positive marginal impact on rm Yjs
prot of an increase in kji is completely o¤set by the negative marginal impact on rm
Y3 js prot. So the fact that both of rm Xis collaborators compete with each other
implies that rm Xis choice of k
j
i does not depend on how such choice a¤ects both of
its collaborators. In consequence, rm Xi behaves in the same way as when it does not
collaborate with either of them. An analogous reasoning explains why rm Yjs choice
of eij is the same both for g = g
1 and for g = g. The existence of opportunity costs of
forming collaboration links then nally provides the explanation why rms and society
would be better o¤ without collaboration.
4 Exclusive collaboration
We now study what happens if rms can only form exclusive collaboration links. This
may be due to explicit or implicit contracting requirements, or to highly competitive con-
ditions that preclude several complementors from being willing to collaborate with the
same rm. In the light of our previous analysis, it is clear that the stable network that
arises when collaboration is exclusive is g = g3. Under g = g3, there is no investment
in improving the match with the complementor with which a rm does not collaborate.
As we showed earlier, this is not an outcome that arises owing to the exclusivity require-
ment, a noteworthy feature of the outcome when g = g3 that ts quite well with such
a requirement (although it does depend on  equaling 1). In addition, the facts thatP2
j=1 k
j
i (g
3) =
P2
j=1 k
j
i (g
1) and
P2
i=1 e
i
j(g
3) =
P2
i=1 e
i
j(g
1) imply that there is as much
as total investment by each rm in an equilibrium under exclusivity as when g = g1.
However, all investment is now concentrated on the complementor with which a rm
collaborates, which is worse from the viewpoint of R&D costs because of their strict con-
vexity. Gross prots in the product market are the same both under g = g1 and g = g3,
since
P2
j=1 k
j
i (g
3) =
P2
j=1 k
j
i (g
1) and
P2
i=1 e
i
j(g
3) =
P2
i=1 e
i
j(g
1). As a result, it follows
that Xi(g
3) = Yj(g
3) < Xi(g
1) = Yj(g
1) for i; j = 1; 2, and each rm would be better
o¤ if collaboration was forbidden or impossible.
Not only would rms be better o¤ by forbidding collaboration, but also consumers as
a whole would get a higher surplus. Thus, the price of a component is the same under
g = g1 and g = g3, and the extra gross utility attained by some consumers is exactly
o¤set by the lower gross utility attained by the others. (This happens because, on the
aggregate, consumers just care about total investment, which is the same under g = g1
and g = g3.) However, transportation costs increase for consumers as a whole under
g = g3 because some systems are less appealing in their vertical attributes, and hence
are bought less than under g = g1. In other words, the vertical di¤erences among some
systems that arise under g = g3 steal consumption away from systems that are preferred
from a horizontal standpoint, thus generating some disutility that does not arise under
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g = g1. As a result, consumer welfare is greater under g = g1 than g = g3, as are (net)
prots made by rms. We then have the following result.
Proposition 3 Let t > 12=54 and suppose that collaborating with a complementor pre-
cludes a rm from collaborating with the complementors competitor. Then the unique
(up to a relabeling of rms) equilibrium network g = f1; 0; 0; 1g is socially suboptimal
and results in a payo¤ for each rm smaller than that achieved when g = f0; 0; 0; 0g.
Proof. Since forming a link costs " > 0 and Xi(g
3) = Yj(g
3) < Xi(g
1) = Yj(g
1)
for i; j = 1; 2, it su¢ ces to show that consumer welfare under g = g3 is smaller than
under g = g1. Both for g = g1 and g = g3, it holds that pX1 = p

X2
= pY1 = p

Y2
= 3t=2,
so p11 = p

12 = p

21 = p

21 = 3t. In addition, the number of consumers purchasing system
XiYj (i; j = 1; 2) under g = g1 is Qij(g
1) = 1=4. However, the number of consumers
purchasing systems X1Y1 and X2Y2 under g = g3 is Q11(g
3) = Q22(g
3) = 1=4 + 1=(18t),
whereas the number of consumers purchasing systems X1Y2 and X2Y1 under g = g3 is
Q12(g
3) = Q21(g
3) = 1=4   1=(18t). Taking into account that line lXiYj (i; j = 1; 2) has
a length of 1/2 and that there exists a unit mass of consumers uniformly spread all over
the four existing lines, the aggregate consumer surplus under g = g1 is
CS(g1) = 4
"
1
2
 
v +
1
12
+
1
12
  3t  t
Z 1=2
0
zdz
!#
,
while the aggregate consumer surplus under g = g3 is
CS(g3) = 2
"
1
2
 
v +
1
6
+
1
6
  3t  t
Z 1=2+1=(9t)
0
zdz
!#
+2
"
1
2
 
v   3t  t
Z 1=2 1=(9t)
0
zdz
!#
.
Because CS(g1)  CS(g3) = 1=(81t) > 0, the desired result follows.
5 Extensions
We now assume that collaborating with another rm entails caring about the prot
generated for such a rm by the system in which both participate, a feature that is
probably more realistic. Thus, if rm Xi collaborates with Yj, but not with Y3 j, then
rm Xi chooses k
j
i and k
3 j
i to maximize 

Xi
+ (jXi   (eij)2) CXi(kji ; k3 ji ). In turn, if
rm Yj collaborates with both Xi and X3 i, then rm Yj chooses eij and e
3 i
j to maximize
Yj + (
i
Yj
  (kij)2) + (3 iYj   (k3 ij )2)   CYj(eij; e3 ij ). As before, we will let  = 1 to
simplify computations, even though results hold for any  2 (0; 1].
Our main result in this context coincides with the one derived before.
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Proposition 4 For t > 11=36, the unique equilibrium network structure is the complete
network, namely g = f1; 1; 1; 1g. In equilibrium, rm Xi chooses to invest kji (g) = 1=8
in improving the quality of its match with complementor Yj, whereas rm Yj chooses to
invest eij(g
) = 1=8 in improving the quality of its match with complementor Xi (i; j =
1; 2). Each rm earns a payo¤ of (24t 1)=32, which is smaller than the payo¤ that each
could achieve if all of them could commit not to collaborating.
Proof. See Appendix.
Relative to Proposition 1, the fact that a rm choosing its investment levels does not
fully internalize the harm they provoke on its complementors implies that there is more
investment and hence more ine¢ ciencies (from the rmsviewpoints). It is worth noting
that these results hold even if forming a collaboration link is not costly, so ine¢ ciencies
are much severe in this setting.
To conclude, we show that results under exclusivity do not change when a rm that
collaborates with a complementor does not care about its entire prot but rather the
prot that it makes from the system in which both rms participate.
Proposition 5 Let t > 11=36 and suppose that collaborating with a complementor pre-
cludes a rm from collaborating with the complementors competitor. Then the unique
(up to a relabeling of rms) equilibrium network g = f1; 0; 0; 1g is socially suboptimal
and results in a payo¤ for each rm smaller than that achieved when g = f0; 0; 0; 0g.
Proof. Both for g = g1 and g = g3, it holds that pX1 = p

X2
= pY1 = p

Y2
= 3t=2,
so p11 = p

12 = p

21 = p

21 = 3t. In addition, the number of consumers purchasing system
XiYj (i; j = 1; 2) under g = g1 is Qij(g
1) = 1=4, so consumer surplus is
CS(g1) = 4
"
1
2
 
v +
1
12
+
1
12
  3t  t
Z 1=2
0
zdz
!#
.
Under network g = g3, we have that Q11 = Q

22 =
1
4
+
5(4  t)
4(77t  2) and Q

12 = Q

21 =
1
4
  5(4  t)
4(77t  2) . Suppose rst that t  4, so that Q

11 = Q

22  1=4 and Q12 = Q21  1=4.
Then consumer surplus is
CS(g3) = 2
"
1
2
 
v +
15t
72t  2 +
15t
72t  2   3t  t
Z 1
2
+
5(4 t)
2(77t 2)
0
zdz
!#
+
2
"
1
2
 
v   3t  t
Z 1
2
  5(4 t)
2(77t 2)
0
zdz
!#
,
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so it holds that
CS(g3)  CS(g1) = 16 + 112t  31172t
2 + 235119t3   2700t4
12(36t  1)(77t  2)2 > 0.
However, joint prots under network g1 are greater than under g3, and the di¤erence
equals
3t(1296t2   147t+ 1)
(36t  1)2  
54t  1
18
=
1  72t  2754t2
18(36t  1)2 .
Because this di¤erence exceeds CS(g3)  CS(g1), we have that the equilibrium network
under exclusivity is socially suboptimal. When t > 4, we have that
CS 0(g3) = 2
"
1
2
 
v +
15t
72t  2 +
15t
72t  2   3t  t
Z 1
2
  5(4 t)
2(77t 2)
0
zdz
!#
+
2
"
1
2
 
v   3t  t
Z 1
2
+
5(4 t)
2(77t 2)
0
zdz
!#
,
so the fact that CS 0(g3) = CS(g3) implies that the above proof goes through directly.
6 Conclusion
The locus of strategic interaction in many high-tech industries has broadened from the
traditional competitive approach based on value capture towards one in which cooper-
ative aspects with regards to value creation also play a critical role, as Brandenburger
and Nalebu¤ (1996) emphasize. Not surprisingly, such "co-opetitive" settings display
rich innovation ecosystems in which complementors collaborate with each other in R&D
actitivities. This paper has shown that such rich innovation ecosystems may be an equi-
librium phenomenon with disturbing properties for their members. In particular, we have
shown that they may be an ine¢ cient outcome for competing rms that can collaborate
with complementors. They may also be ine¢ cient for society. These results hold under
a variety of scenarios (e.g., regardless of whether or not collaboration exhibits exclusive
features).
In this paper, we have abstracted away from dynamics to clarify our points, but there
are many issues that have to do with dynamic variables. For example, collaboration
may refer to the timing at which complementary products are brought to the market.
Exploring this kind of issues seems promising enough to warrant further work on this
completely unexplored area.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4. Let g = g1 and assume that t > 1=54 so that payo¤
functions are strictly concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, prots and quantities
sold of each system are nonnegative. Then we know that k11(g
1) = 1=12, k21(g
1) = 1=12,
e11(g
1) = 1=12, e21(g
1) = 1=12, k12(g
1) = 1=12, k22(g
1) = 1=12, e12(g
1) = 1=12 and e22(g
1) =
1=12. In addition,
Xi(g
1) = Yj(g
1) =
54t  1
72
for all i; j = 1; 2.
We now consider g = g2 under the assumption that t > 6=54 so that payo¤ func-
tions are strictly concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, prots and quantities sold
of each system are nonnegative. Firm X1 chooses k11 and k
2
1 to maximize 

X1
+ 1X1  
(e11)
2   CX1(k11; k21), whereas rm X2 chooses k12 and k22 to maximize X2   CX2(k12; k22).
In addition, rm Y1 chooses e11 and e
2
1 to maximize 

Y1
+ 1Y1   (k11)2   CY1(e11; e21),
whereas rm Y2 chooses e12 and e
2
2 to maximize 

Y2
  CY2(e12; e22). Then we have that
k11(g
2) =
9t(180t  7)
2 + 648t(12t  1) , k
2
1(g
2) = 0, e11(g
2) =
9t(180t  7)
2 + 648t(12t  1) , e
2
1(g
2) = 0, k12(g
2) =
72t(9t  1)
2 + 648t(12t  1) , k
2
2(g
2) =
72t(9t  1)
2 + 648t(12t  1) , e
1
2(g
2) =
72t(9t  1)
2 + 648t(12t  1) and e
2
2(g
2) =
27t  1  
6(54t  2  ) . Also,
X1(g
2) =
3tf4 + 243t[8t(67 + 18t(432t  73))  9]g
(2 + 648t(12t  1))2 ,
Y1(g
2) =
3tf4 + 243t[8t(67 + 18t(432t  73))  9]g
(2 + 648t(12t  1))2
X2(g
2) =
10368t2(54t  1)(9t  1)2
(2 + 648t(12t  1))2
and
Y2(g
2) =
10368t2(54t  1)(9t  1)2
(2 + 648t(12t  1))2 .
We now let g = g3 and assume that t > 11=36 so that payo¤ functions are strictly
concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, prots and quantities sold of each system
are nonnegative, as usual. Firm X1 chooses k11 and k
2
1 to maximize 

X1
+ 1X1   (e11)2  
CX1(k
1
1; k
2
1), whereas rmX2 chooses k
1
2 and k
2
2 to maximize 

X2
+2X2 (e22)2 CX2(k12; k22).
In addition, rm Y1 chooses e11 and e
2
1 to maximize 

Y1
+1Y1  (k11)2 CY1(e11; e21), whereas
rm Y2 chooses e12 and e
2
2 to maximize 

Y2
+ 2Y2   (k22)2   CY2(e12; e22). Then k11(g3) =
15t
72t  2 , k
2
1(g
3) = 0, e11(g
3) =
15t
72t  2 , e
2
1(g
3) = 0, k12(g
3) = 0, k22(g
3) =
15t
72t  2 , e
1
2(g
3) =
25
0 and e22(g
3) =
15t
72t  2 . In addition, we have that
Xi(g
3) = Yj(g
3) =
3t(1296t2   147t+ 1)
4(36t  1)2 for i; j = 1; 2.
We turn now to g = g4 and assume that t > 13=108 so that payo¤ functions are
strictly concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, prots and quantities sold of each
system are nonnegative. FirmX1 chooses k11 and k
2
1 to maximize 

X1
+1X1 (e11)2+2X1 
(e12)
2 CX1(k11; k21), whereas rm X2 chooses k12 and k22 to maximize X2 CX2(k12; k22). In
addition, rm Y1 chooses e11 and e
2
1 to maximize 

Y1
+ 1Y1   (k11)2   CY1(e11; e21), whereas
rm Y2 chooses e12 and e
2
2 to maximize 

Y2
+ 1Y2   (k21)2   CY2(e12; e22). It then holds
that k11(g
4) =
3(36t  1)
8(108t  7) , k
2
1(g
4) =
3(36t  1)
8(108t  7) , e
1
1(g
4) =
540t  17
24(108t  7) , e
2
1(g
4) = 0,
k12(g
4) =
108t  13
12(108t  7) , k
2
2(g
4) =
108t  13
12(108t  7) , e
1
2(g
4) =
540t  17
24(108t  7) and e
2
2(g
4) = 0.
This results in the following prots:
X1(g
4) =
3[16t(14 + 27t(216t  13))  3]
32(108t  7)2 ,
X2(g
4) =
(54t  1)(108t  13)2
72(108t  7)2
and
Yj(g
4) =
(108t  1)(46656t2   8316t+ 289)
576(108t  7)2 for j = 1; 2.
Let g = g5 and assume that t > (71 +
p
409)=432 so that payo¤ functions are
strictly concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, prots and quantities sold of each
system are nonnegative. In this case, rm X1 chooses k11 and k
2
1 to maximize 

X1
+
1X1   (e11)2 + 2X1   (e12)2   CX1(k11; k21), whereas rm X2 chooses k12 and k22 to maximize
X2 + 
2
X2
  (e22)2   CX2(k12; k22). In addition, rm Y1 chooses e11 and e21 to maximize
Y1+
1
Y1
  (k11)2 CY1(e11; e21), whereas rm Y2 chooses e12 and e22 to maximize Y2+1Y2 
(k21)
2 + 2Y2   (k22)2   CY2(e12; e22). it holds that k11(g5) =
5832t2   675t  1
24(1944t2   261t+ 4) , k
2
1(g
5) =
27t(216t  25)
24(1944t2   261t+ 4) , e
1
1(g
5) =
9720t2   1143t+ 1
24(1944t2   261t+ 4) , e
2
1(g
5) = 0, k12(g
5) = 0, k22(g
5) =
9720t2   1143t+ 1
24(1944t2   261t+ 4) , e
1
2(g
5) =
27t(216t  25)
24(1944t2   261t+ 4) and e
2
2(g
5) =
5832t2   675t  1
24(1944t2   261t+ 4) .
All this results in the following prots:
X1(g
5) = Y2(g
5) =
27tf31 + 54t[24t(871 + 216t(216t  55))  341]g   1
576(4 + 9t(216t  29))2
26
and
X2(g
5) = Y1(g
5) =
9tf5297 + 9t[5184t(196 + 27t(144t  55))  50809]g   1
576(4 + 9t(216t  29))2 .
Finally, let g = g6 and assume that t > 5=108 so that payo¤ functions are strictly
concave and (equilibrium) investment levels, prots and quantities sold of each system are
nonnegative. Then k11(g
6) = 1=8, k21(g
6) = 1=8, e11(g
6) = 1=8, e21(g
6) = 1=8, k12(g
6) = 1=8,
k22(g
6) = 1=8, e12(g
6) = 1=8 and e22(g
6) = 1=8. In addition,
Xi(g
6) = Yj(g
6) =
24t  1
32
for all i; j = 1; 2.
We now show that the unique equilibrium network is g = g6 if it holds that t > 11=36.
Note rst that, since X1(g
2) = Y1(g
2) > Y1(g
1) = X1(g
1), it follows that X1(g
2) 
X1(g
1) does not imply that Y1(g
2) < Y1(g
1), and hence g = g1 cannot be a stable
network. In addition, the fact that X2(g
3) = Y2(g
3) > Y2(g
2) = X2(g
2) yields that
X2(g
3)  X2(g2) does not imply that Y2(g3) < Y2(g2), and hence g = g2 cannot be
a stable network either. Because X1(g
5) = Y2(g
5) > Y2(g
3) = X1(g
3), it also follows
that X1(g
5)  X1(g3) does not imply that Y2(g5) < Y2(g3), which shows that g = g3
cannot be a stable network. To show that the same applies to network g = g4, note that it
holds that X2(g
5) > X2(g
4) and Y2(g
5) > Y2(g
4) so it follows that X2(g
5)  X2(g4)
does not imply that Y2(g
5) < Y2(g
4), which shows that g = g4 cannot be a stable
network. Because it also holds that X2(g
6) > X2(g
5) and Y1(g
6) > Y1(g
5), we have
that X2(g
6)  X2(g5) does not imply that Y1(g6) < Y1(g5), and hence g = g5 cannot
be a stable network. The fact that Xi(g
6) > Xi(g
5) for i = 1; 2 and Yj(g
6) > Yj(g
5)
for j = 1; 2 implies that g = g6 is an equilibrium network for t > 11=36.
27
References
[1] Adner, R. (2006). Match Your Innovation Strategy to Your Innovation Ecosystem.
Harvard Business Review, 84(4), 98-107.
[2] Adner, R. and Kapoor, R. (2010). Value Creation in Innovation Ecosystems: How
the Structure of Technological Interdependence A¤ects Firm Performance in New
Technology Generations. Strategic Management Journal, 31(3), 306-333.
[3] Bloch, F. (1995), Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies, RAND Jour-
nal of Economics, 26, 537-556.
[4] Bloch, F. (2005), Group and Network Formation in Industrial Organization: A Sur-
vey, in Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions (G. De-
mange and M. Wooders, eds.), Cambridge University Press.
[5] Brandenburger, A. and B. Nalebu¤ (1996), Co-opetition, Doubleday: New York.
[6] Casadesus-Masanell, R., B. Nalebu¤ and D. B. Yo¢ e (2008), Competing Comple-
ments, Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-009.
[7] Chen, Y. and M. H. Riordan (2007), Price and Variety in the Spokes Model, Eco-
nomic Journal, 117, 897-921.
[8] Cournot, A. A. (1838), Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie
des Richesses, Paris: Hachette.
[9] Choi, J. P. (2008), Mergers with Bundling in Complementary Markets, Journal of
Industrial Economics, 56, 553-577.
[10] DAspremont, C. and A. Jaquemin, (1988), Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D
in Duopoly with Spillovers, American Economic Review, 78, 1133-1137.
[11] Denicolò, V. (2000), Compatibility and Bundling with Generalist and Specialist
Firms, Journal of Industrial Economics, 48, 177-188.
[12] Economides, N. (1989), Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network
Externalities, American Economic Review, 79, 1165-1181.
[13] Economides, N. and S. C. Salop (1992), Competition and Integration among Com-
plements, and Network Market Structure, Journal of Industrial Economics, 40, 105
123.
[14] Gawer, A. and M. Cusumano (2002). Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft,
and Cisco Drive Industry Innovation. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
28
[15] Gawer, A. and R. Henderson (2007), Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Com-
plementary Markets: Evidence from Intel, Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, 16, 1-34.
[16] Goyal, S. and S. Joshi (2003), Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly, Games and
Economic Behavior, 43, 57-85.
[17] Goyal, S. and J. L. Moraga-González (2001), R&D networks, RAND Journal of
Economics, 32 (4), 686-707.
[18] Goyal, S., Konovalov, A. and J. L. Moraga-González (2008), Hybrid R&D, Journal
of the European Economic Association, 6 (6), 1309-1338.
[19] Jackson, M. O. (2008). Social and Economic Networks. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey.
[20] Jackson, M. O. and A. Wolinsky (1996), A Strategic Model of Social and Economic
Networks, Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 44-74.
[21] Kamien, M. I., Muller, E. and I. Zang (1992), Research Joint Ventures and R&D
Cartels, American Economic Review, 85, 1293-1306.
[22] Leahy, T. and J. P. Neary (1997), Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic indus-
tries, American Economic Review, 87(4), 642-662.
[23] Matutes, C. and P. Regibeau (1988), Mix and Match: Product Compatibility With-
out Network Externalities, RAND Journal of Economics, 19, 221-234.
[24] Moore, J. F. (1996). The Death of Competition: Leadership and Strategy in the Age
of Business Ecosystems. Harper Business: New York.
[25] Westbrock, B. (2010), Natural Concentration in Industrial Research Collaboration,
RAND Journal of Economics, 41, 351-371.
29
